TPF: Jane Mayer: “The Predator War”

AFGHANISTAN
See other AFGHANISTAN Articles

Title: Jane Mayer: “The Predator War”
Source: The New Yorker (abstract, full article by subscription only)
URL Source: http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/10/26/091026fa_fact_mayer
Published: Oct 22, 2009
Author: Jane Mayer
Post Date: 2009-10-22 23:51:37 by Robin
Keywords: None
Views: 1243

ABSTRACT:

THE POLITICAL SCENE about the C.I.A.’s covert drone program. On August 5th, officials at the C.I.A., in Langley, VA, watched a live video feed relaying closeup footage of one of the most wanted terrorists in Pakistan, Baitullah Mehsud, on the rooftop of his father-in-law’s house.

The video was captured by the infrared camera of a Predator drone—a remotely controlled, unmanned plane that had been hovering, undetected, two miles or so above the house. The C.I.A. remotely launched two Hellfire missiles from the Predator, and Mehsud and eleven others died.

There was no controversy when, a few days after the missile strike, CNN reported that President Barack Obama had authorized it. However, there was widespread anger after the Wall Street Journal revealed, at about the same time, that during the Bush Administration the C.I.A. had considered setting up hit squads to capture or kill Al Qaeda operatives around the world.

Hina Shamsi, a human-rights lawyer at the New York University School of Law, was struck by the inconsistency of the public’s responses. She said of the Predator program, “These are targeted international killings by the state.”

The Predator program, as it happens, also uses private contractors for a variety of tasks, including “flying” the drones. The U.S. government runs two drone programs. The military’s version, which is publicly acknowledged, operates in the recognized war zones of Afghanistan and Iraq, and targets combatants in support of U.S. troops stationed there.

The C.I.A.’s program is aimed at terror suspects around the world, including in places where U.S. troops are not based. The program is classified as covert, and the C.I.A. declines to provide any information to the public about where it operates, how it selects targets, who is in charge, or how many people have been killed. Nevertheless, reports of fatal air strikes in Pakistan emerge every few days.

According to a new study by the New America Foundation, the number of drone strikes has gone up dramatically since Obama became President. General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, the defense contractor that manufactures the Predator and its more heavily armed sibling, the Reaper, can barely keep up with the government’s demand. With public disenchantment mounting over the U.S. troop deployment in Afghanistan, many in Washington support an even greater reliance on Predator strikes. And because of the program’s secrecy, there is no visible system of accountability in place.

Peter W. Singer, the author of “Wired for War,” a recent book about the robotics revolution in modern combat, argues that the drone program is worryingly “seductive,” because it creates the perception that war can be “costless.” Cut off from the realities of the bombings in Pakistan, Americans have been insulated from the human toll, as well as the political and moral consequences.

The advent of the Predator targeted-killing program “is really a sea change,” says Gary Solis. Before September 11th, the C.I.A. refused to deploy the Predator for anything other than surveillance. Eight years later, there is no longer any doubt that targeted killing has become official U.S. policy.

The Predator program is described by many in the intelligence world as America’s single most effective weapon against Al Qaeda. But the program has stirred deep ethical concerns. According to the New America Foundation’s study, only six of the forty-one C.I.A. drone strikes conducted by the Obama Administration in Pakistan have targeted Al Qaeda.

Click for Full Text!

An MQ-9 Reaper drone's fail-safe programming failed and it rushed through Afghanistan's airspace on Sunday. The US Air Force simply responded by sending a manned plane to shoot it down. Turns out this isn't all that uncommon.

Apparently the pilots of an unmanned, but armed, MQ-9 Reaper drone lost control of the UAV a few days ago. The resulting manned mission to take it down was mounted almost immediately and ended successfully before the drone reached the edges of Afghanistan's airspace.

I wonder what would've happened if the Reaper hadn't been shot down. It is typically used for "hunter-killer" missions and targets enemies on the ground. Would it continue a mission like that without operator input?

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles like the Reaper are supposed to be programmed to return to their home bases in case they lose contact with their pilots. There's no explanation as to why the fail-safe didn't kick in for this particular Reaper. Nor is this incident the first time that a UAV has been shot down by intentional friendly fire. What's going on and when can I start to panic? [Aviation Weekly via Popular Science]

What’s Behind the Drones?

Spencer Ackerman 10/22/09 2:14 PM

Andrew Exum of the Center for a New American Security, a critic of the CIA’s Predator drone program in the Pakistani tribal areas, writes:

I worry that the CIA is carrying out their own campaign in part because a) it’s been getting kicked around so much since 9/11 that it is now overly focused on killing high-level al-Qaeda targets rather than gathering intelligence and that b) it’s trying to justify and defend its budget through what it can claim is a successful program.

Exum correctly argues that the drones are a tactic — not a strategy, and certainly not a silver bullet. The implication, though, is that CIA can’t be expected to come up with a strategy. That’s the president’s job. As best as I can determine, the agency really does consider the program a remarkable success — rightly or wrongly — and while it helps that such a success gets the agency out of its post-9/11 whipping-boy mode, that alone doesn’t explain CIA’s all-guns-blazing support for the program.

Nor is the agency responsible for how policymakers want to view it. But ultimately, the faith that some invest in the Predator program is toxic for CIA. Ultimately, the drones can’t solve the United States’ counterterrorism problems in Pakistan, and the easiest tendency in the entire national security bureaucracy is to blame the CIA for not magically resolving all strategic complexities.

(1 image)

Post Comment Private Reply Ignore Thread